Finding
Connected machines can cause physical harm, and since 2024-25 regulators require security and supply-chain controls in the design itself
When software controls brakes, battery charging or grid inverters, a breach can cause physical damage or injury. Regulators responded on two fronts. UN Regulations 155 and 156 have required a certified cybersecurity management system and software-update management system for every new vehicle sold in the EU since July 2024. In the US, the Commerce Department's January 2025 rule bans connected-vehicle software tied to China or Russia from model year 2027 and their connectivity hardware from model year 2030.
The technical controls are well known: hardware roots of trust and secure boot so only signed software runs, encrypted and authenticated vehicle networks, signed OTA packages with rollback, separation between safety-critical and connected functions, and monitoring for intrusions across the fleet. Chargers and grid inverters face the same threats with less regulation; a compromised charger network can disrupt both drivers and the grid. Supply-chain origin is now a security attribute, not just a cost line.
Controls
Core security controls
| Control | Protects against | Standard or rule |
|---|---|---|
| Secure boot, hardware root of trust | Unauthorized software | ISO/SAE 21434 |
| Signed OTA with rollback | Malicious or broken updates | UN R156 |
| Network segmentation | Lateral movement to safety functions | ISO/SAE 21434 |
| Fleet monitoring | Undetected intrusions | UN R155 |
| Supply-chain origin checks | Adversary-controlled components | US connected vehicle rule (BIS) |
Sources
Sources and scope
- Scope
- Cyber-Physical Security for Software-Defined Systems
- Sources
- UNECE R155/R156; US Commerce BIS final rule (January 2025); ISO/SAE 21434
- Updated
- October 2026